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ABSTRACT
This Article aims to create a complete typology of the forms of
decisional law. Distinguishing “rules” from “standards” is the most
commonly attempted jurisprudential line, roughly drawn between
nonvague and vague. But no agreement exists on the dimension
along which the rule/standard terminology lies, or on where the
dividing line on the continuum lies. Thus, classifying in terms of
vagueness is itself vague. Ultimately it does not aid legal actors in
formulating or applying the law. The classification works best as an
evocative image.
A clearer distinction would be useful in formulating and applying
the law. For the law-applier, it would be more useful if expressly
focused on whether the law-giver was trying to pin things down and
thus narrow the room for discretion. For the law-giver, it would be
more useful if it had helped to think about how to pin things down.
This better top-level distinction divides binary from scalar
directives. If the directive comprises a checklist of one or more
yes/no conditions, then it is a binary directive. If instead the
directive calls for consideration of multivalent factors, it is a scalar
directive. First, binary/scalar is a superior distinction for analysis
because it is a clean distinction. Second, it is a telling distinction
that represents a significant difference between the components
that compose the law. Third, it tells the law-applier much about
whether the law-giver tried to pin things down. Fourth, it conveys
a better sense of the tools at hand for the law-giver’s pinning down
the law-applier, and thus enables the tools’ deployment in an
optimal way. Fifth, it allows the drawing of meaningful subdivisions
that bring to the fore the choices in shaping that law: for example,
one such subtype of scalar directives is a true balancing test, which
explicitly or implicitly presents an exhaustive listing of quantifiable
and commensurable considerations to be scaled and weighed
against one another—and so offers a route to retrieving some
control in the application of any scalar directive.
Parenthetically, a running example to illustrate the superiority
of binary/scalar comes from injunctive relief. The test for a
temporary restraining order was the supposedly binary condition of
“irreparable harm,” but it has disintegrated in practice to the
prevailing test for a preliminary injunction. The diversity among
the tests for preliminary injunctions reveals the essential struggle
between the necessary flexibility for infinitely variable situations
and the need for appropriately corralling the judges’ discretion.
From ancient roots of unrestrained discretion, the test for a
preliminary injunction has evolved in recent decades from a
sequential test of four supposedly binary conditions to the
indefiniteness of a sliding-scale approach that balances the socalled four factors, back to a hopeless stab at crispness in the form
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of the alternatives test that tries to state alternative combinations
of situational facts warranting provisional relief. The best test
emerges as a systematized form of scalar directive—a true
balancing test—that asks if the expected costs of a potentially
wrongful denial exceed the expected costs of a potentially wrongful
grant of a preliminary injunction. The inadequacy of the current
rule/standard distinction for this analysis reveals itself in the fact
that it would probably categorize all the competing preliminary
injunction tests as “standards.”
In the end, this Article does not propose casting rule/standard
aside as a way of evocatively classifying decisional law. Instead, it
proposes adopting binary/scalar as the way technically to define
rules and standards: a rule appears as a yes/no checklist, and a
standard involves a subjective or multidimensional scalar
measurement.
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INTRODUCTION
Without form, substance is but mud. Or so it is said.1
Accordingly, my aim in this Article is to create a complete
typology of the forms of decisional law. To be complete, it
needs to be a top-down organizational structure that divides
the whole subject. Thereafter, it needs to make optimally
expressive subdivisions.
By “decisional law,” I mean any law that could ultimately
direct or guide a decision rendered by an adjudicator or other
law-applier. The decision might be a judgment by a judge,
but it also could be a decision by any other legal actor in the
executive, or by a private citizen to treat some agreement as
a binding contract, or whatever. As mine is an inclusive
definition,2 my coverage extends to both substantive and
procedural doctrine. Nonetheless, my extended illustrations
will concentrate on the procedural side, and indeed
injunctive relief will be a major focus of the illustrations.
Civil procedure lies within my expertise and cuts across most
substantive fields. Moreover, maintaining a focus will lend a
consistency of illustration.
The “forms” of concern are the forms into which lawgivers (be it constitution, legislature, delegatee, or court)
express law to guide decision by a law-applier. In the
1. See Thomas Ainsworth, Form vs. Matter, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/; Sean Gregory,
Author John McPhee Still Finds Wonder in the Outdoors, Chocolate and Circus
Bears, TIME, Dec. 17, 2018, at 14, 15 (quoting John McPhee) (“Sooner or later,
you have to have a sense of structure, or all you’ve got is a bowl of spaghetti.”).
But cf. JACK KEROUAC, THE DHARMA BUMS 24 (Penguin Books ed., 1976) (“It’s only
through form that we can realize emptiness.”). On the importance of the formal
component of law, see generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A
LEGAL SYSTEM—A GENERAL STUDY 17–24 (2006). On the substantive component,
see generally Howard Robinson, Substance, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Nov.
16, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/.
2. My definition is not all-inclusive, however. I do not include descriptive
rules or even prescriptive rules, like “Thou shalt not steal.” And I include only
legal provisions. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE
1–12 (1991).
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abstract, the conceivable variations on form are virtually
unlimited. But in practice, given law’s twin missions of lawgiving and law-applying, only certain forms appear. Because
legal directives are functions that take conditions to
consequence, the existing forms are all variations on if-then,
that is, condition-consequence (or antecedent-consequent).3
Thus, all decisional law can be restated as “if conditions, then
consequence.”4 The conditions are essentially factual, in a
broadly conceived sense. They might be yes/no variables; but
they can be variables measured on a scale, such as matters
of degree, opinion, or normative values, some of which might
be called mixed facts.5 Consequences can be and are varied.
They embody all the outputs of the legal system.
The law-applier (be it a judge or any other legal actor,
public or private) determines the satisfaction of the
conditions by a more or less formal factfinding process. That
process could involve generating evidence-based beliefs in
the truth of facts and then testing them by the standard of
proof, or it could require the factfinder’s best judgment of the
condition’s placement on a scale.6 The law-applier then

3. See Dorothy Edgington, Indicative Conditionals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conditionals/ (“Despite
intensive work of great ingenuity, this remains a highly controversial subject.”);
cf. Luís Duarte d’Almeida, On the Legal Syllogism, in DIMENSIONS OF
NORMATIVITY 335, 335 (David Plunkett et al. eds., 2019) (criticizing this formal
view of directives’ application).
4. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381 (1985)
(“It is possible to look at positive law (constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions,
and administrative orders) as a series of directives. The formula for a legal
directive is ‘if this, then that.’ A directive thus has two parts: a ‘trigger’ that
identifies some phenomenon and a ‘response’ that requires or authorizes a legal
consequence when that phenomenon is present.”).
5. For example, the definition of “mixed facts” for appeal purposes and for
jury right differs. See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M.
CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1525–33, 1597–
601 (13th ed. 2020) (defining “fact” for jury and for appeal).
6. In all events, cognition in factfinding remains pretty much a black box.
“The actual process may be rational or intuitive, although it should involve socalled critical common sense. It may proceed atomistically or holistically.” Kevin
M. Clermont, Staying Faithful to the Standards of Proof, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
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applies the law by deductive syllogism to reach a
consequence.
There is much this Article is not trying to do. It is not
categorizing law by source, purpose, or function. It is not
dealing with either the law or the practice for making
decisional law. Hence, it is not worried about the appropriate
content of decisional law or, at least as a central question,
when one form of decisional law or another is appropriate.
Instead, this Article’s aim is a typology of the forms of
decisional law. The focus will be on form as a means of
constraint in law’s application. I shall critique the usual
rule/standard distinction in Part I, and then introduce an
alternative typology in Part II.

1457, 1465–66 (2019) (footnotes omitted). The best view “based on psychology,
and introspection,” posits that factfinders proceed to a stab at judgment about
satisfaction of each condition largely by intuition and in an approximate and
nonquantified way. Id. at 1467.
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I. RULES V. STANDARDS
Distinguishing “rules” from “standards” is the most
common jurisprudential line attempted with regard to
decisional law, because most theorists think it is a
particularly useful one.7 They prefer it to other conceivable
dimensions along which to make distinctions for the purpose
of typology.8
A. Supposed Distinction
How do rules differ from standards? It ends up rather
vague.9 A standard guides decision by giving some explicit or
implicit formula of considerations, with the decisional law
being given most of its content during its application. A
standard might do no more than list a few considerations for
the adjudicator or other decider somehow to take into
account in deciding how to handle a difficult problem in the
context of a particular case, or it might only suggest
considerations
by
some
condition
such
as
“unreasonableness.” A rule in the contrary sense is a largely
determinate statement that acquires most of its content
during drafting. It goes far toward dictating in advance the
outcome of the problem, leaving to the adjudicator only the
finding of facts without worrying about the purpose of the
rule or about moral considerations.

7. See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs.
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 23 (2000) (“The choice of legal form has
long been described as a choice between ‘rules’ and ‘standards.’”); Schlag, supra
note 4, at 379, 381–82 (“Every student of law has at some point encountered the
‘bright line rule’ and the ‘flexible standard.’ . . . [D]irectives can be general or
specific, conditional or absolute, narrow or broad, weak or strong. They can also
be rules or standards. Thus, the opposition of rules and standards is one
dimension of the form of a legal directive.”).
8. See, e.g., Michael Evan Gold, Levels of Abstraction in Legal Thinking, 42
S. ILL. U. L.J. 117, 119 (2018) (“In general, the more persons and transactions to
which an issue and its resolution apply, the higher the level of abstraction . . . .”).
9. “Vague” herein means unclearly limited. See Roy Sorensen, Vagueness,
§ 4, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/vagueness/ (“[A] term is vague to the extent that it has borderline cases.”).
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Listing other characteristics of rules and standards
might help make the distinction. On the one hand, standards
tend to be easier to draft. Their application can be more
precise in reaction to the particular case, avoiding the costs
of over- and under-inclusion. They need less amendment to
fit the changing environment over time. However, these
characteristics are only generally true, as some standards
can be quite rule-like in practice. On the other hand, rules
are often costly to promulgate, but less costly for courts and
people to apply, so that the economics tend to favor
employing rules for decisional law that will require frequent
application in recurring situations.10 Rules tend to produce
more predictable and consistent application, and they
usually convey more information, with the result that people
can better self-regulate11 or evade.12 Rules better protect
rights from erosion over time.13 However, rules are
10. See Hans-Bernd Schaefer, Legal Rules and Standards, in 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 347, 347–48 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich
Schneider eds., 2004) (making this economics point).
11. See Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1298–99 (2006) (arguing for rules over standards, in the
interest of self-governance); cf. James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine
on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 773–76
(1995) (cataloging other attempts to justify a general bias in favor of either rules
or standards).
12. See Nance, supra note 11, at 1309–11; Claire Stamler-Goody, Finding
Meaning in Rules and Standards, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/finding-meaning-rules-and-standards
(discussing Anthony J. Casey’s talk on “The Short Happy Life of Rules and
Standards”: “When the government pre-commits to strict laws, it cannot be
subject to ex post bias and twist them in its favor after events have unfolded.
Rules have high pre-commitment, while standards’ pre-commitment is low. The
flipside of pre-commitment is evasion, Casey added, because when people know
the exact content of a law, they are better equipped to find loopholes and evade
it for their own benefit.”).
13. See Robert G. Bone, The Story of Connecticut v. Doehr: Balancing Costs
and Benefits in Defining Procedural Rights, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 159, 196
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“[T]he point of a right is that it constrains
the sort of reasons that can be used to justify limits.”); T.M. Scanlon, Rights,
Balancing, and Proportionality 5 (Oct. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462529 (arguing that rights should not be balanced
against other rights or interests).
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sometimes impractical or even impossible to promulgate, as
the drafters possess too little knowledge, the permutations
for application are too numerous, or the limitations of
language impede the task.14
In sum, many conflicting considerations affect the choice
between rules and standards as currently conceived, leaving
the choice largely ad hoc.15 That is to say, no rule exists to
choose between rules and standards. The choice of form
should turn on a cost-minimization strategy that takes into
account the full range of error costs and direct costs. Still,
one can generalize that tax laws tend to be rule-dominated,
while antitrust likes its standards including its misnamed

14. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961) (going beyond the
indeterminacy of language to identify two relevant handicaps of the human
condition: “The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our
relative indeterminacy of aim.”).
15. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 58–59 (“The normative question of whether
to promulgate law in the form of rules or standards seems unanswerable with a
rule, even a complex one. Presenting lawmakers with a set of multiple factors to
weigh in standard-like fashion is probably all that legal scholars can do.”);
Wilson, supra note 11, at 842 (“Choosing the proper form is part of a simultaneous
equation, which arguably includes at least the following other factors: the
plaintiff’s interests, defendant’s interests, ease of formulating a remedy, nature
of the claim (constitutional versus statutory or common law), foreseeable costs
and benefits of favoring either party, degree of concern about future abuses by
similar parties, nature of those abuses, prior record of similar parties, any
relevant statutory or constitutional text, purposes of that text, legislative history,
subsequent history, mischief that the text was attempting to cure, structure of
the system the text created, judicial competence, role of the judiciary, precedent,
judge’s personal views and experiences, public opinion, judge’s sense of selfconfidence, concerns about future discretion, evidentiary problems, and
competing legitimate ends, both substantive and judicial process, that judges
must try to achieve.”); cf. Korobkin, supra note 7, at 58 (bringing in behavioral
analysis to supplement economic analysis, but concluding: “Under either
approach, an honest analyst without preconceived conclusions must ultimately
say that multiple considerations favor each type of legal form, and which form is
most desirable will depend on which set of competing costs dominate in a
particular fact-specific situation.”).
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Rule of Reason.16 Conflict of laws has migrated from rules to
standards for choice of law, and maybe is on the way back.17
Taking a closer look at procedure for more examples, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to be a set of
general provisions that would be uniform for all substantive
and procedural types of cases across the whole nation.18
Those goals created pressures on the drafters. One
consequence was the domination of brief and simple Federal
Rules riddled with gaps. The same pressures pushed the
general jurisprudential tenor of the Federal Rules toward
standards rather than rules. Still, the Federal Rules fully
range along a continuum that goes from standards, whose
application requires considerable judicial judgment and
discretion, down to quite determinate rules. Accordingly,
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i) uses a standard in disallowing discovery
that is “unreasonably cumulative,” while Rule 4(c)(2)
establishes the rule that process may be served by anyone
“who is at least 18 years old and not a party.” Some of the
Rules (e.g., Rule 19 on who should or must be joined as a
party) need to be set forth as standards, but other Rules (e.g.,
Rule 12 on the amount of time to answer) should be in the
form of a rule. Most of the other Rules fall in the middle,
although some Rules might improve upon the rule-amenders’

16. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965) (contrasting per se rules).
17. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1972) (“There is, however,
no reason why choice-of-law rules, more narrow than those previously devised,
should not be successfully developed, in order to assure a greater degree of
predictability and uniformity, on the basis of our present knowledge and
experience.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Certainty vs. Flexibility in the Conflict of
Laws 7 (Dec. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law School), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301554 (arguing that
“[c]ontemporary (as opposed to modern) choice of law is often rule-based,” with
narrow rules formulated to optimize systemic and correctness values). Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (using
standards), with RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (using
broad rules).
18. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 51–56 (5th ed.
2018) (expanding this discussion).
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recalculating the benefits of either a more standard-like
approach or a more rule-like approach.
All that said, no agreement in fact exists on what exactly
the rule/standard terminology means, because there is no
agreement even as to the dimension along which the
distinction lies.19 For maximal usefulness, any distinction
should focus on some essential difference along one
particular dimension.20 But what is that dimension here? In
the dominant discussions, the rule/standard distinction gets
phrased as specific v. general21 or ex ante v. ex post.22
On the one hand, specific/general in this context refers,
albeit counterintuitively, to the form’s level of
incompleteness in statement.23 Confusingly, it does not refer
to narrow or broad in coverage, nor to complex or simple in
expression. Although these braces of adjectives are among
the many possible alternative distinctions that have been
used to define rules and standards,24 they do not work. The

19. See Schlag, supra note 4, at 382 n.16 (“The terms ‘rules’ and ‘standards’
do not have clear and fixed meanings in the scholarly literature.”).
20. Professor Schlag said, “The trigger can be either empirical or evaluative,
and the response can be either determined or guided.” Id. at 382. But he went on
to say that, at least as a paradigm, “a rule has a hard empirical trigger and a
hard determinate response. . . . A standard, by contrast, has a soft evaluative
trigger and a soft modulated response.” Id. at 382–83. He thus instinctively
reduced a 2x2 distinction to a single dimension.
21. See Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 43, 49–50 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed.
2009) (modeling the optimal specificity of laws, with rules having high specificity
and standards having low specificity).
22. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (“[T]he only distinction between rules and standards is
the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after
individuals act.”).
23. See Luppi & Parisi, supra note 21, at 43 (“Lawmakers can choose the level
of incompleteness of the laws that they write by formulating laws with different
degrees of specificity.”).
24. See SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 136–81 (listing as distinctions:
prescriptiveness,
completeness,
definiteness,
generality,
structure,
encapsulation, and expression); Kaplow, supra note 22, at 560 & nn.4–5, 565 &
n.13 (giving alternative definitions of rule/standard distinction).
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fatal reason is that the usual examples of rules and
standards are not distinguishable in these terms.25 Both
rules and standards can be narrow, broad, simple, or
complex. A simple rule, and especially a complex series of
simple rules, could be very broad in application. A complex
standard could still be narrow in coverage.
On the other hand, ex ante/ex post posits a definition
that turns on whether the real lawmaking is done by the lawgiver ex ante or by the law-applier ex post, that is, before or
after the actor acts.26 Supposedly, rules are specified in
advance in a legislative way, while standards leave to the
later adjudicator or other decider the work of weighing the
standard’s considerations. Thus, the ex ante/ex post
distinction brings to the fore a comparison of institutional
advantages. Yet institutional concerns bear more on how to
make decisional law than on how to distinguish rules from
standards.27 Indeed, the distinction does not do a perfect job
at separating rules from standards. First, the reality in our
legal system is that, for lawmaking, before-or-after is always
a matter of degree. The distribution of functions to law-givers
and law-appliers is mixed too. Even rules leave some of the
work in shaping the law to the law-applier. The law-applier
can also generate standards in effect, or develop rules, for
present and future use and thus also act as law-giver.
Second, if the ex ante/ex post distinction were reliable, it
would better track the law/fact distinction, at least for rules.
As it is, both rules and standards can generate issues of law

25. See Kaplow, supra note 22, at 586 (“For any standard, consider the actual
outcomes that would arise for all possible cases. Now, define the ‘rule equivalent
to the standard’ . . . as that rule which attaches these same outcomes to these
cases. Thus, if a standard is compared to the rule equivalent to the standard, the
content and level of detail are held constant.” (footnote omitted)).
26. See id. (distinguishing whether laws should be relatively simple or
complex from whether laws are given content ex ante as rules or ex post as
standards); cf. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605
(1908) (drawing the line between mechanical jurisprudence and discretionary
decision making).
27. See Schaefer, supra note 10, at 348–49.
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as well as of fact for the law-applier. Third, and most
importantly, some laws that look very much like ex ante
rules leave much discretion to the law-applier by virtue of
the vagueness of language, while some standards such as a
tightly defined balancing test can effectively box in the lawapplier. “Rules” can thereby be standards, and “standards”
can act like rules.
These two attempts at distinction, specific/general and
ex ante/ex post, emphasize respectively the conditions or the
consequence of decisional law. The former distinction focuses
on whether the conditions have been completely specified.
The latter focuses on whether the law determines the
consequence before the act. But a focus on the consequence
is misplaced. Conditions offer a more effective distinction.
The character of the conditions better captures whether the
law-giver has spelled things out to the law-applier, which is
the most informative of the generally correlated attributes of
rules and standards.
As to distinguishing among types of conditions,
specific/general arguably marks the right direction to go. Its
exact path and its signage could be improved. For the
purposes of this Article, I shall employ this dimension: The
best expression of the essential difference in the nature of the
conditions in rules and standards comes in terms of
vagueness, with vagueness increasing from rules to standards
and so making the conditions less determinative.28
Still, a critical defect of the vagueness dimension is that
it remains a spectral distinction, always a matter of degree.
The proposed distinction of ex ante/ex post was in part an
attempt to forge a clearer dividing line, but it had only
limited success in that pursuit. A better solution would be to

28. The spectrum culminates in “heaps,” an expression that refers to the most
hopelessly vague concepts. See Dominic Hyde & Diana Raffman, Sorites Paradox,
§ 1, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/sorites-paradox/ (“The name ‘sorites’ derives from the Greek word soros,
meaning ‘heap.’”).

2020]

RULES, STANDARDS, AND SUCH

765

establish a boundary along the dimension of vagueness that
might be conveyed by the phrase of hard v. soft forms.29
Vagueness may have yet another defect, namely, it could
be a multidimensional feature. This helps to explain why
authors have not been able to agree on a single criterion to
define rule/standard. Some authors indeed use multiple
criteria in distinguishing among forms.30 Thus, Professor
Summers eschewed rule/standard in favor of measuring
completeness (having no spaces left in the law) and
definitiveness (having fixity and specificity).31
Therefore, a distinction between rules and standards in
terms of vagueness will itself be an inevitably vague
distinction. Moreover, this distinction does not attend to all
the variables that influence choice of form, such as
institutional capacities. Accordingly, the reader might well
prefer any of the many other attempts to define
rule/standard. Obviously, they have a lot of overlap. The real
takeaway is that commentators do not agree on a definition.
Given the difficulty of definition, why then do
commentators persist in speaking of rules and standards?
The allure of rule/standard comes from its encapsulating the
eternally central debate in jurisprudence over the relative

29. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards, and
Principles, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 6, 2009, 9:40 AM), http://lsolum.typepad
.com/legaltheory/2009/09/legal-theory-lexicon-rules-standards-and-principles.
html. Incidentally, Professor Solum calls a single, broad, nonexhaustive
consideration a “principle.” Id. (giving as an example the principle that one may
not benefit from one’s own wrong). Professor Dworkin used “principle” in a broad
way that subsumed “standard.” See Ronald W. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–29 (1967).
30. E.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 30 (2001) (defining rules as opposed to
standards in terms of determinateness, but also requiring of rules a completeness
that settles all questions within the rule’s scope).
31. See SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 147–60; cf. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 75 (1987)
(distinguishing, in this earlier work, between flexible rules and hard and fast
rules).
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values of workable certainty and flexible accuracy. 32 Rules
would specify the operative facts that trigger the
consequence, while standards would rely more on the
underlying principles and policies as triggers.33 Standards
would tend to give sensitivity and precision, while rules
would tend to give predictability and reliability. The
unattainable aim in lawmaking would be to use standards
and rules in a way that, while focusing the decision maker’s
attention on all relevant considerations, optimizes the size of
the decision maker’s black box of discretion.34
B. Disadvantages
The shortcomings of rule/standard as a distinction, then,
are obvious. First, the dimension along which the distinction
is to be drawn is disputed by theorists, as described in the
prior section. Perhaps the distinction ends up more of a
multidimensional feeling. Second, any defining dimension
certainly constitutes a continuum.35 There are sharp brightline rules and relatively vague rules, and there are relatively
bright-line (e.g., a tightly defined balancing test) and very
vague (e.g., impose consequence if justice so requires)
standards. Third, whatever the dimension we are traveling,
the dividing line between rules and standards on the
continuum is certainly not a clean one. Standards and rules
32. See Schlag, supra note 4, at 380 (“[I]t follows that much of legal discourse
(including the very fanciest law-talk) might be nothing more than the
unilluminating invocation of ‘canned’ pro and con arguments about rules and
standards.”).
33. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 23 (“Rules state a determinate legal result
that follows from one or more triggering facts. . . . Standards, in contrast, require
legal decision makers to apply a background principle or set of principles to a
particularized set of facts in order to reach a legal conclusion.”); cf. Nance, supra
note 11, at 1295–96 (stating the same, but admitting that a standard may be
expressed in a way that looks like a rule, and vice versa).
34. See EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW
556–59 (2018).

AND

ECONOMICS

35. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 26 (“[T]he two types of legal forms are
better understood, as a descriptive matter, as endpoints of a spectrum . . . .”);
Nance, supra note 11, at 1296–97.
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can even hop over the dividing line, with standards becoming
rules through the doctrine of precedent, and rules becoming
standards by the creation of exceptions.36 Because there is no
clarity about rules and standards, the distinction, as
represented by the following diagram, will never be fully
informative.37

Fourth, and more troubling, the key characteristics of
rules and of standards, the ones that would seem to relate to
definition, are inconstant. That is, some laws classified as a
rule can be quite standard-like in operation, and vice versa.
A rule might not pin down the law-applier at all, while a
standard could corral the law-applier quite effectively. For
example, power, or minimum contacts, exists for specific
jurisdiction38 if state-directed acts are (a) closely enough
“related” to the claim39 and (b) substantial enough to
36. See Nance, supra note 11, at 1297; cf. Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The
Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules, Standards, and Judicial Discretion, 93
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 31 (2019) (“It may be apparent that AI can turn standards into
rules.”).
37. The diagram comes from Korobkin, supra note 7, at 29.
38. For general jurisdiction, the Court has been more successful in moving
from International Shoe’s standard of minimum contacts to a rule. See Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (authorizing usual general jurisdiction over
corporations only at the place of incorporation and at the worldwide principal
place of business); cf. Linda J. Silberman, The Continuing Relevance of Private
International Law and Its Challenges: Judicial Jurisdiction and Forum Access—
The Search for Predictable Rules 2, 54–55 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19-02, 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3312437 (arguing that recent Supreme Court cases on general and
specific jurisdiction mark a move from standards toward predictable rules).
39. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
The Court declined to pin down the required relation. It just said that in order
for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the claim must relate to the
forum through the defendant’s contacts with the forum. “When there is no such

768

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

constitute “purposeful availment.”40 Although this is a rule
in form—relatedness + purposeful availment = power—it is
about as subjective as provisions come.41 For a contrary
example, think of the “when justice so requires” test for
amendment of the pleadings under Federal Rule 15(a)(2).42
In practice early in the litigation, this standard works like a
rule because the law-applier routinely allows a prompt
amendment, in order to avoid reversal. Indeed, very early on
in the litigation, Federal Rule 15(a)(1) actually converts the
amendment standard into a determinate rule, granting the
right to amend “as a matter of course.”43
Fifth, and more forgivably, the rule/standard distinction
fails to capture completely all the variables that should
inform the choice of form. Rule/standard also gives no
practical handle on how to formulate the law. Instead, this
classification can yield only a feeling about what the law
came up with.
Nonetheless, as already suggested, a distinction in terms
of vagueness can be a useful and illuminating one. Even if
the difference between rule and standard itself turns out to
be vague, this “distinction” is useful as an evocative image,
one that addresses the question of how much the law pins
connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s
unconnected activities in the State.” Id. at 1781.
40. See CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 273, 285–86. Power for specific
jurisdiction will exist for related claims as long as the activity is above some
pretty low level. The defendant must have performed acts directed to the forum
state with a purpose to avail itself of “the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). So-called
purposeful availment thus seems to work as a sort of tacit submission to
foreseeable jurisdiction that is fair for the defendant.
41. “Subjective” herein means a decision based on personal perspective, and
thus inevitably entailing personal feelings and opinions. Subjective and
Objective, IND. U. BLOOMINGTON, http://www.indiana.edu/~p1013447/dictionary/
subjobj.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice
so requires.”).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1) (“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter
of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it . . . .”).
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things down. And a very good question to ask in applying law
is whether the lawmaker tried to pin things down.
Rule/standard would indeed be more useful if it were
more expressly focused on the question of whether the lawgiver was trying to pin things down. A vague focus on
vagueness does not directly answer the question.
Rule/standard would be even more useful if it had helped the
law-giver to think about whether and how to pin down the
law-applier. Jurisprudence should focus on the tool kit of
methods available to pin things down. Therefore, I propose a
classification, so-focused, that can still provide the evocative
image.
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II. BINARY DIRECTIVES V. SCALAR DIRECTIVES
I want to propose a better top-level distinction among the
forms of decisional law. The apparent challenge is that
although all decisional law can be restated as “if conditions,
then consequence,” the actual form of the relationship among
the directive’s conditions is virtually unlimited in theory.
That is, you could have something like “if proposition p
implies proposition q, then the consequence r ensues.”
However, I know of no such directive in decisional law. So
far, all directives come in one of two forms:
if p is true and/or . . . , then r,
or
if p suffices, perhaps in relation to other
considerations . . . , then r,
where p is, respectively, a determinative element or a
relevant consideration whose magnitude matters. Both
forms reflect the allocation of the burden of persuasion and
can accommodate any standard of proof.
The distinction between the two forms is whether the
proposition p is binary or scalar. Binary propositions are
those that are true or false, yes or no, 0 or 1. Scalar
propositions can take intermediate values, which represent
a statement in some multivalent metric.44 The two words are
not mere adjectives. The distinction between binary and

44. Gustave Flaubert to his mistress Louise Colet, Dec. 11, 1846: « Nier
l’existence des sentiments tièdes parce qu’ils sont tièdes, c’est nier le soleil tant qu’il
n’est pas à midi. La vérité est tout autant dans les demi-teintes que dans les tons
tranchés. » OEUVRES COMPLÈTES DE GUSTAVE FLAUBERT: CORRESPONDANCE,
PREMIÈRE SÉRIE (1830–1846), at 417 (Louis Conrad ed., 1926) (translated to
English: “To deny the existence of lukewarm sentiments because they are
lukewarm is to deny the sun when it is not at noon. Truth lies as much in its
shadings as it does in vivid tones.”).
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scalar is a very important distinction. Binary and scalar are
the two basic ways in which law expresses measurements.45
Binary and scalar also mark the divide between the two
dominant logical systems: classical bivalent logic and
modern multivalent logic.46 Bivalent logicians use “crisp
sets,” a phrase that describes any set for which instances fall
either in the set or outside the set. But multivalent logicians
use sets with instances that can be partly in and partly out,
making “indefinite,” or fuzzy, sets. I propose to use “crisp” as
a synonym of binary, and “indefinite” as a synonym of scalar.
Imagine (a) the crisp set of all men from five to seven feet tall
for which the measure is that the individual is in or out, and
then contrast it with (b) the indefinite set of men somewhere
near six feet tall in which the measure can vary from 0 to 1.47

The former, but not the latter, could be a crisp or binary
condition. If a legal directive comprises a checklist of one or
45. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Scalars & Binaries, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Oct. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/
2018/10/legal-theory-lexicon-scalars-binaries.html (mixing conditions and
consequences together); cf. Larry Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary
Judgments, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 85 (2008) (questioning binary moral judgments
that turn on scalar properties).
46. See Kevin M. Clermont, Conjunction of Evidence and Multivalent Logic,
in LAW AND THE NEW LOGICS 32, 36–48 (H. Patrick Glenn & Lionel D. Smith eds.,
2017) (describing the difference).
47. The figure comes from Timothy J. Ross & W. Jerry Parkinson, Fuzzy Set
Theory, Fuzzy Logic, and Fuzzy Systems, in FUZZY LOGIC AND PROBABILITY
APPLICATIONS 29, 30 (Timothy J. Ross et al. eds., 2002).
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more binary conditions, then it is a crisp or binary directive.
If instead the directive calls for consideration of scalar
measures, it is an indefinite or scalar directive.48
Once the factual conditions are found to exist, the
application of a binary directive is usually easy. Application
is presumptively objective and rigid. By contrast, a scalar
directive passes the real decision to the law-applier. It
conveys the message of a discretionary “may” to the lawapplier, rather than “must.”49
However, findings as to binary conditions are by no
means guaranteed to be easy. To the degree that the lawgiver’s chosen conditions are not really crisp, the factfinding
task will be more challenging. First, even seemingly crisp
facts involve uncertainty. At the level of natural language,
all concepts are somewhat vague.50 Second, one indefinite
measure always lies behind otherwise crisp facts. The
“standard of decision,” which attaches to every legal decision,
specifies the required measure of sureness, measured in
degrees of belief, for reaching any decision.51 Third, a crisp
proposition might rest on a scalar measure. If it rests on a
scalar measure that is a unidimensional value rather than a

48. If the directive rests on a unidimensional scalar with an ascertainable
cutoff, the scalar will serve as a binary condition. See infra text accompanying
note 52.
49. See BENGT LINDELL, MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS IN LEGAL REASONING 19
(2017) (“That the court [in a procedural matter] ‘may’ do something usually
means that there is a balancing of interests.”).
50. See Bertrand Russell, Vagueness, 1 AUSTRALASIAN J. PSYCHOL. & PHIL. 84,
84 (1923); see also BERTRAND RUSSELL, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, in
LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE 175, 180 (Robert Charles Marsh ed., 1956) (“Everything
is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise, and
everything precise is so remote from everything that we normally think, that you
cannot for a moment suppose that is what we really mean when we say what we
think.”). But cf., e.g., TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS (1994); Hartry Field, No
Fact of the Matter, 81 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 457 (2003) (countering the
Williamson view).
51. See generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD
ABROAD (2013).
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vector and that has a readily ascertainable cutoff, the
proposition can still serve as a condition of a crisp directive.
A speed limit of 70 mph is thus a crisp directive, because the
determination of speeding is still intended as a yes-or-no
issue based on that single, unidimensional, objective
measurement: if speed exceeds 70 mph, then guilty.52 The
law-applier can often make fast work of a speed limit, thanks
to a speedometer or radar gun, but other underlying scalar
measures usually make a crisp proposition more difficult to
handle. In sum, because all crisp conditions are to a degree
scalar, they can present challenges beyond the normal
uncertainties of factfinding.
The defining feature of a binary directive, then, is not
how easily a condition is found to exist, but rather whether
all the conditions are supposed to be addressed as yes/no
issues. A binary directive is a legal test whose conditions (p,
etc.) comprise a series of yes/no requirements, because the
law-giver implicitly either saw all the conditions as bivalent
rather than multivalent or at least wanted them to be treated
as if bivalent rather than multivalent.
If there are subjective or multidimensional scalar
measures involved in determining whether a condition
exists, they cannot be viewed as ending in a yes/no
determination. It is an indefinite condition. Moreover, if any
condition is indefinite, the overall directive will be
indefinite.53
52. The common invocation of a speed limit as the archetypical “rule,” e.g.,
Kaplow, supra note 22, at 560; Korobkin, supra note 7, at 23; Nance, supra note
11, at 1300, encourages me to extend beyond procedural examples and supports
the wisdom of classifying the speed limit as a crisp directive. Interestingly, states
always back up their numerical speed limit with a truly scalar directive. E.g.,
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1180(a) (McKinney 2019) (“No person shall drive a
vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.”); see also
infra Section II.D (treating combination of directives).
53. Some empirical support exists for the proposition that attempts to pin
down a “standard” by presumptions or by factor tests do not cut back on the
exercise of discretion by judges. See Prentiss Cox, Fractured Justice: An
Experimental Study of Pretrial Judicial Decision-making, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 365,
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These indefinite measures can be called “factors,” not in
the sense of the inputs for some balancing technique, but in
the accepted sense of an “influence” on a decision. The factors
must be considered in relation to one another. Incidentally,
factors can be explicitly or implicitly scalar. And a multitude
of measures can be conveyed by a single word; for example,
a speed limit prohibiting unreasonable speeds would form an
indefinite directive.
C. Advantages
The proposed distinction is between binary directives
that turn on a checklist of solely yes/no facts and scalar
directives that entail scaled factors most often considered in
connection with other factors. Even if binary/scalar does not
determine how much work is left to the law-applier, it tells
you what kind of work is left for the law-applier and hence
gives a sense of how much freedom is left to it.
Binary directives would often be currently classified as
rules, but not always. A formally binary condition might
require a subjective, difficult call by the law-applier.
Similarly, scalar directives would usually be standards in
today’s usage. But a balancing test of a few objective scalar
measurements might be very rule-like. Nonetheless, because
binary/scalar at least correlates with the rule/standard
attributes, the former shares the latter’s advantages as an
evocative image. For example, binary directives are usually
of easy, predictable, certain, and consistent application, and
so they work to constrain the law-applier. By contrast, scalar
directives usually shift most of the decisional work to the
law-applier.
Also, binary/scalar is a technical distinction superior to
rule/standard as currently conceived. First, there is a clean
distinction between binary and scalar. It turns on whether
or not the conditions were viewed as yes/no. Second,
binary/scalar is a telling distinction that represents a real
388–90 (2019).
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difference in the components of law. Binary and scalar
measures mark a basic divide. Third, we want to know if the
law-giver tried to pin things down. In applying law, we
should therefore ask whether the law-giver used binary
terms or scalar terms. Fourth, binary/scalar conveys a better
sense of the tools at hand for the law-giver’s pinning down
the law-applier. It thus enables the tools’ deployment in an
optimal way. Fifth, it allows the drawing of meaningful
subdivisions of binary and of scalar, which bring to the fore
the choices in shaping that law, as will be shown below.
Binary/scalar evokes most of the same feelings now
evoked by the rule/standard distinction, but it is analytically
stronger. It allows us to drill down on how well the law-giver
can pin down, or has pinned down, the law-applier.
D. Binary Directives
The notion of binary directives is readily conveyed by the
phrase “elemental decision making.” For example, a cause of
action will succeed if each of its elements is found to exist. To
be a binary directive, the law-giver must have been thinking
that the conditions would be addressed as yes/no issues. As
to the consequence of the elements’ existence, it is
necessarily yes/no, or dichotomous.
Prime Example of Binary Directive: temporary
restraining order.
A temporary restraining order, or “TRO,” is
provisional injunctive relief that is of very short
duration, with the judge acting without a hearing and
sometimes even without advance notice to the
defendant. The order is typically a stopgap, “to
preserve the status quo” and so preserve the capacity
to give final relief.54 It is given in expectation of a
54. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2951, at 274 (3d ed. 2013); see id. at 279
(discussing the aim to preserve availability of final relief). But see id. at 291
(acknowledging that affirmative relief is possible albeit rarely (citing United
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preliminary injunction, which differs in that it comes
only after a hearing.55
As to the test for granting or denying a TRO, the
plaintiff must make a showing of immediate and
irreparable harm.56 The law-giver has tried to keep
the test simple and crisp, in recognition of the
inadequate procedure for airing the facts.
The judge, of course, will not often find this test to
be crisp. In all likelihood, moreover, the judge will be
influenced by a sense of the merits and the balance of
harms to the parties and the public. A binary directive
just will not work here. So, a bare reference to
“immediate irreparable injury” represents little more
than hope for a rock in a sea of indefiniteness. Or it
represents only a necessary condition, with the court
in its discretion able to take those other factors into
account.57 The end result in practice is a scalar
directive that does not differ much from the test for a
preliminary injunction.58
States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (allowing hospital to
administer blood transfusion))). As to fixing the TRO’s nonbinary terms, see infra
text accompanying note 84 (discussing nondichotomous consequences).
55. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2947, at 116–17 (distinguishing
the two remedies).
56. See id. § 2951, at 274, 278–79 (phrasing the requirement as “the
possibility that irreparable injury will occur before the hearing for a preliminary
injunction” and reiterating the need for immediate relief); cf. FED. R. CIV. P.
65(b)(1)(A) (providing that an ex parte TRO requires facts “clearly show[ing] that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition”); infra note 58 (discussing
“clear showing”).
57. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2951, at 294 (stating that “[t]here are
several factors in addition to irreparable injury that usually are considered by
the court in exercising this discretion,” mentioning probability of success, the
balance of hardships, and the public interests).
58. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Option One Mortg., 321 F. Supp. 3d 186, 188 (D.
Mass. 2018) (“In evaluating a motion for a TRO, the Court considers the same
four factors that apply to a motion for preliminary injunction, that is: the
likelihood the movant will succeed on the merits, whether the movant is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence preliminary relief, the balance of equities,
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1. Necessary v. Sufficient
One might think that a useful subdivision of binary
directives would be between necessary elements and
sufficient conditions. Necessary elements would be those
joined by the conjunction “and.” Only if all the elements are
found would the specified consequence follow. By contrast, a
sufficient condition would be one joined by “or.” An example
could be constructed from several affirmative defenses.
However, this subdivision is of illusory significance. Any
set of necessary elements can be viewed as a sufficient way
to get to a specified consequence that is reachable by some
alternative route. One tends to use the terminology of
sufficient conditions whenever the alternative routes to a

and whether an injunction is in the public interest.”); Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Miss.
Chem. Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1468, 1473 & n.8 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (“Ordinarily, the
grant or denial of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction in this
circuit is determined upon consideration of the factors stated in Dataphase Sys.,
Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). . . . Those
standards require that a preliminary injunction or TRO issue only after
consideration of the following factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that
granting the injunction will inflict on other parties involved in the litigation;
(3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public
interest.”). Some authorities suggest that the standard of proof is elevated to
reflect the remedy’s emergency and drastic nature and its more truncated
procedure. See, e.g., Free Country Ltd. v. Drennen, 235 F. Supp. 3d 559, 565
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The standard for an entry of a TRO is essentially the same as
for a preliminary injunction. . . . Therefore, a TRO, perhaps even more so than a
preliminary injunction, is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should
not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.’” (quoting JBR, Inc. v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., 618 F. App’x 31,
33 (2d Cir. 2015))); cf. KRISTIN STOLL-DEBELL, NANCY L. DEMPSEY & BRADFORD E.
DEMPSEY, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS 150 (2009) (saying that TROs “tend to be more difficult to obtain”).
Elevating the standard of proof for a TRO, which issues without a hearing, would
make good sense perhaps. But courts also mention a “clear showing” being
required for a preliminary injunction. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2948,
at 119–21. Thus, this particular “clear showing” standard of proof for provisional
injunctive relief seems more a rhetorical flourish than an actual requirement. See
id. at 121–22 (“Although these shorthand formulations aptly express the courts’
general reluctance to impose an interim restraint on defendant before the parties’
rights have been adjudicated, they do not take the place of a sound evaluation of
the factors relevant to granting relief under Rule 65(a).”).
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decision are obvious. Without subdividing, we can simply use
condition to mean a necessary or sufficient finding that tends
to allow a claim or defense to succeed under the substantive
law.59
2. Hard v. Soft
A better subdivision would be between hard and soft
degrees of crispness. Again, there are binary directives that
are hard (bright-line, like a speed limit of 70 mph) and scalar
directives that are soft (vague, like a speed limit prohibiting
unreasonable speeds). But such a spectrum exists among
binary directives alone. Some binary directives have all
conditions being truly crisp, and others have one or more
conditions being spongy. On the one hand, requiring a
process server to be “at least 18 years old and not a party” is
pretty crisp.60 On the other hand, designating a counterclaim
as compulsory if it arises from the same “transaction or
occurrence” is pretty vague.61 If the rule makers nevertheless
meant “transaction or occurrence” as a binary determination,
the transactional requirement would be a condition in a
binary directive; if, however, they meant to delegate the
transactional decision to future law-appliers by calling for a
consideration of various scalar factors, “transaction or
occurrence” would form a scalar directive that guides how to
decide.
In general, softly crisp directives are to be avoided.62
Such directives erode the clean distinction between binary

59. See Michael R. Smith, Elements v. Factors (pts. 1 & 2), WYO. LAW., Apr.
2016, at 46, Aug. 2016, at 50.
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2).
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A); FIELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 73–78;
Douglas D. McFarland, In Search of the Transaction or Occurrence:
Counterclaims, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 699 (2007); cf. Douglas D. McFarland,
Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Transaction or Occurrence and the Claim
Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 247 (2011) (generalizing his
treatment).
62. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 30, at 33 (“If the rules did this—if,
in other words, the rules were really standards—then they could not settle the
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and scalar. If any condition does not really possess an on/off
nature, it is preferable to state the directive as an honestly
scalar one. Whether the inherently spongy condition is stated
in binary or scalar terms, the law-applier will usually do the
real work of decision. Using a falsely binary form will not
constrain that law-applier. Alternatively, if a statute states
a spongy condition in binary form, textualist courts might
woodenly pervert the law in supposed deference to the
legislature. In either event, the law-giver will be better able
to constrain the law-applier in appropriate ways by explicitly
embracing indefiniteness, as I shall now explain.
E. Scalar Directives
The notion of scalar directives is readily conveyed by the
phrase “factorial decision making.” An example comes by
switching from the power test for personal jurisdiction to its
reasonableness test, a cumulative test whereby the court
must consider these factors:
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding
that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern,
will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant
factors, including the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the
plaintiff’s power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies. 63

The characteristic feature of these factors is that the lawgiver was not thinking that the conditions would be
addressed as yes/no issues, but instead would be evaluated
on a scale and then somehow integrated. “Reasonableness”
might sound like a yes/no issue, but in any realistic sense it
is only suggesting a range of considerations. The law-giver’s

very questions they were meant to settle.”).
63. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(citations omitted).
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contribution thus is a guide for decision, one that ensures
putting some scope of considerations before the law-applier.
In any scalar directive, the factors are relatively freeform, discretionary, and subjective, if compared to a
determinative element. The nature of the factors to be
considered varies widely. They can involve assessment of
values, principles, policies, and objectives. Or they can be
more concrete. Examples include probabilities of future
events, dollars in estimating harm as damages, and expected
cost. The last of these examples involves the multiplication
of probabilities and dollars, and so makes the point that some
operations, such as multiplication, can be necessary to
evaluate the factor.
To reach a decision, the law-applier must decide the
degree to which each factor is present. The law-applier must
then consider all factors in relation to each other. Some
factors will compensate for the weakness of others, and some
factors will undercut others. Here is another source of the
law-applier’s robust discretion, which is the key feature of a
scalar directive. The law-applier has real “choosing” power.
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Prime Example of Scalar Directive: preliminary
injunction.
After notice and hearing, the court may grant a
motion for a preliminary injunction, which can last
until final judgment.64 Granting the remedy is
discretionary.65 It is said that “a district court must
have considerable discretion because of the infinite
variety of situations which may confront it.”66 The
leading treatise states the purpose of the remedy thus:
Although the fundamental fairness of preventing
irremediable harm to a party is an important factor on a
preliminary-injunction application, the most compelling
reason in favor of entering a Rule 65(a) order is the need to
prevent the judicial process from being rendered futile by
defendant’s action or refusal to act. On the other hand,
judicial intervention before the merits have been finally
determined may impose a burden on defendant that
ultimately turns out to have been unjustified.
Consequently, the preliminary injunction is appropriate
whenever the policy of preserving the court’s power to
decide the case effectively outweighs the risk of imposing an
interim restraint before it has done so.67

By clarifying the purpose and then drafting a test
tightly focused on that purpose, “a court’s discretion

64. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2947. Compare Erik A. Christiansen,
Preliminary Injunctions Live or Die on Powerful Evidence of Wrongdoing,
LITIGATION, Winter 2019, at 14, 16 (“A preliminary injunction hearing is most
often like a full-blown trial on the merits.”), with Maggie Wittlin, Meta-Evidence
and Preliminary Injunctions, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356215 (showing that rules of evidence do not apply
at a preliminary injunction hearing).
65. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017)
(“Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment,
often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the
legal issues it presents.”).
66. A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 761, 763 (3d Cir.
1971).
67. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2947, at 114 (footnote omitted).
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will be bounded by the attributes of the standard
itself.”68
In the very old days the judge’s discretion was
largely unconstrained, except by various soon-obsolete
restrictions tied to the jurisdiction of and comity
between courts.69 By the nineteenth century various
modern themes of constraint started to emerge, most
often tied to the balance of harms and the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success.70 Today, courts pursue an
optimally constrained flexibility by a “dizzying
diversity of formulations.”71 The dominant approach is

68. Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 842 (1989); see also R. Grant
Hammond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model, 30 U. TOR. L.J. 240,
272 (1980) (“A discretionary formula, though fashionable, raises the dangers of
potential judicial arbitrariness with respect to a remedy which is often dispositive
of litigation and the difficulties of mounting an appeal from a discretion.”).
69. See John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 525, 527–32 (1978).
70. See id. at 532–40.
71. Id. at 526; see Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction:
Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 507–30, 538–39 (2003)
(arguing for a three-factor sequential test); Vaughn, supra note 68, at 840–42
(arguing for a sliding-scale test); Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The
Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173, 183, 235–36 (1984) (arguing,
after observing that “the federal appellate courts use at least nine different tests,”
for a five-step approach closely related to nineteenth-century practice); see also
11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2943, at 75–79 (favoring application of the
federal standard under Erie, which comports with almost all the federal case
law); Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and
Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1291, 1317–22 (2000) (favoring state law); Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Our Equity:
Federalism and Chancery, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 176, 180, 259–65 (2017) (favoring
federal law); Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie and the Standards for
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REV. 457, 474–80 (2018)
(favoring state law); David E. Shipley, The Preliminary Injunction Standard in
Diversity: A Typical Unguided Erie Choice, 50 GA. L. REV. 1169, 1212–25 (2017)
(favoring federal law); Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Standards in
Massachusetts State and Federal Courts, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2–3 & n.6,
35–53 (2013) (favoring state law, and raising the problem of reverse-Erie’s
possible call for federal law applying in state court); cf. Hammond, supra note 68,
at 281 (arguing, after surveying Anglo-American law, for a test that would serve
the purpose of “preservation of litigation for an effective later decision”). For more
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a four-factor test that asks the court (1) whether the
plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the preliminary
injunction is denied, (2) whether the harm to the
plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied will
exceed the harm to the defendant if it is granted, (3)
whether the plaintiff is reasonably likely to prevail at
trial, and (4) whether the public interests will be
affected by granting or denying the injunction.72
Some courts require the plaintiff “to carry the
heavy burden of proving all four factors . . . . In this
form, the standard is called the traditional or
sequential test.”73 That is, these courts hold onto the
hope of preserving a binary directive, despite the
hopelessness owing to the great uncertainty about
what each of the four factors means.74 Consequently,
these courts are too stingy in granting preliminary
injunctions.75
A more progressive approach calls on the court
instead to apply the four-factor test as a sliding-scale
test. The court will somehow combine those four
on the comparative front, see TORSTEN FRANK KOSCHINKA & PIERO LEANZA,
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS: GERMANY, ENGLAND/WALES, ITALY AND FRANCE (2015).
72. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2948,
at 122–24. Some courts list other factors. See, e.g., Lawson Products, Inc. v.
Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433, 1441 (7th Cir. 1986) (mentioning a fifth factor:
“no adequate remedy at law”). But these additional “factors” seem to be separate
requirements expressing the idea that preliminary injunctions are subject to the
usual restrictions on equitable relief, although some of those restrictions might
already be implicit in the four factors. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54,
§ 2948.1, at 129 (saying that irreparable harm cannot usually be shown “if it
appears that the applicant has an adequate alternative remedy”); infra note 101.
73. Vaughn, supra note 68, at 840.
74. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, §§ 2948.1–2948.4.
75. See Taylor Payne, Now Is the Winter of Ginsburg’s Dissent: Unifying the
Circuit Split as to Preliminary Injunctions and Establishing a Sliding Scale Test,
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 15, 47–50 (2018).

784

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

factors, granting or denying provisional relief in a
more or less rigorous attempt to choose the superior
path.76 That is, granting this discretionary remedy to
minimize wrongful harm will involve measuring the
tilt toward interim relief in the balance of the
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s harms and the public
interests, with the required degree of tilt decreasing
as the likelihood of the plaintiff’s ultimate success on
the merits increases.77 On the one hand, the incredible
range of free play in such a scalar directive helps
explain the preliminary injunction’s dark history of
misuse against labor unions and civil rights
activists.78 On the other hand, common sense calls for
the balancing of factors, because it is obvious, for an
example, that a plaintiff who is almost certain to win
should be allowed to get by with a lesser showing on
the balance of harms. In any event, although both the
sequential and the sliding-scale tests might be
“standards,” they are fundamentally different in that
one is a failed attempt at crispness and the other is a
fervent embrace of indefiniteness.
Many other examples of scalar directives could be
listed.79 They might employ different scales. The scale in use

76. See Vaughn, supra note 68, at 840.
77. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11–12 (7th Cir.
1992) (applying this sliding-scale approach).
78. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (jailing
Martin Luther King, Jr.); The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, CQ PRESS
(Feb. 4, 1928), https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresr
re1928020400 (“The basic objection raised against the injunction when it first
came into wide use in labor disputes was that it was an instrument of the rich for
suppressing the legitimate efforts of the poor . . . .”).
79. For a very close example, the question on a stay is the same as the
question on a preliminary injunction. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426
(2009) (“[A] court considers four factors: ‘(1) whether the stay applicant has made
a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the
applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the
stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.’” (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,
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will affect the form of the decisional law. The varying nature
of the scale in use could even generate subdivisions of scalar
directives, but so subdividing would yield few insights. There
are, however, many other possible bases for subdividing, and
some are quite instructive.
1. Hard v. Soft
Like rules, standards, and binary directives, the range of
scalar directives extends from relatively hard (e.g., minimize
the sum of two specified costs) to very soft (e.g., act in the
interests of justice). Similarly, the factors could be
subclassified as objective or subjective. An objective factor
could even be mechanically measurable, such as speed, while
“unreasonably cumulative” discovery calls for a very
subjective judgment.
One could roughly place a scalar directive somewhere on
either of these continua, but the subdividing effort would not
be as informative as making some other possible distinctions
listed below. The reason is that most scalar directives
already have a lot of flexibility, and so these distinctions
would not add much classification value. Moreover, the hardto-soft or objective-to-subjective continuum might mask
those other distinctions.
2. Additive v. Nonadditive

776 (1987))); Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 544, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Posner, J.) (ruling that the same test applies to stays as to preliminary
injunctions: “It amounts simply to weighting harm to a party by the merit of his
case.”). But some mistakenly argue that a stay poses a different question. E.g.,
Jill Wieber Lens, Stays of Injunctive Relief Pending Appeal: Why the Merits
Should Not Matter, 43 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1319, 1358 (2016) (focusing only on
“whether circumstances could change in a way that would render the appellate
court unable to issue a decision meaningful to the parties, how the parties might
be harmed by the relief, or lack thereof, and the public interest”); Portia Pedro,
Stays, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 869 (2018) (arguing that the purpose of a stay pending
appeal is to protect a meaningful opportunity to appeal where guaranteed); cf.
infra note 105 (observing similar vacillation on the purpose of a preliminary
injunction).
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The factors in a scalar directive are multivalent. That is,
they are not only true or false, but can take any value on the
scale. Further, they might be simply multivalent or they
could actually be fuzzy.80
By “simply multivalent,” I mean scalar measures that
are still additive. In an additive system, a set and its
complement add to the universe, or one. Thus, the
probability that an event will happen and the probability
that it will not happen add to one.
Contrastingly, in the fuzzy world, a set can overlap its
complement, which means that additivity does not prevail.
Hence, nonadditive fuzzy measures are subject to fuzzy
multivalent logic rather than classical binary logic. An
example here is fuzzy degrees of belief and disbelief in a fact,
where the factfinder retains some belief as uncommitted
between true and false, so that belief and disbelief do not add
to one.
For some purposes, this nonadditivity distinction could
be an important difference. Fuzzy calculations would follow
a different logical system than, say, probabilities that
ultimately assume bivalence. Measuring the fuzzy factor’s
size would thus call for the application of fuzzy logic’s
distinctive logical operators when performing such
operations as conjunction or disjunction.81 However, in the
final step of deducing the consequence from fuzzy factors, the
presence of fuzzy factors would present no complications,
because those factors would have undergone the step of
defuzzification.82

80. See Clermont, supra note 6, at 1462–63 nn.20–22, 1487 nn.97–100
(distinguishing the two terms on the basis of the additivity feature, in that
multivalent does not necessarily imply nonadditive).
81. See id. at 1486–95 (rejecting the product rule for fuzzy measures, and
instead applying fuzzy logic’s MIN and MAX rules for conjunction and
disjunction, respectively).
82. See CLERMONT, supra note 51, at 208 (“The law dictates that factfinders
decide by subjecting their fuzzy beliefs to a standard of proof in order to come to
an unambiguous output. That is, at this point the law forces factfinders back into
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3. Dichotomous v. Nondichotomous
As a matter of form, we can also subclassify scalar
directives by their consequence.83 Outputs can be yes/no or
can be selected among multiple choices.84 I am speaking of
dichotomous or nondichotomous consequences here, as
opposed to the binary or nonbinary conditions discussed
above.
Most scalar directives have a dichotomous consequence.
But a nondichotomous consequence is possible for them, and
indeed common in criminal sentences, money damages, or
terms of injunctions. For a nondichotomous consequence, the
factfinder could sequentially consider the factors with
respect to each outcome and choose the optimizing one. Or
the factfinder could formulate its best judgment of the
conditions’ satisfaction by placing its estimate of the
situation on some commensurable scale. With the latter sort
of method, the law could be quite comfortable with a range of
consequences. Each possible consequence would correspond
to a point on or a part of the scale. Sometimes the law would
correlate decisional categories, like the degrees of the crime,
to the scale’s metric. Sometimes the scale’s metric would
directly produce the consequence, as is done with money
damages.
4. Exhaustive v. Nonexhaustive
what looks like a two-valued logic, by forcing them to decide for one party or the
other. Such disambiguation is not a practice unique to law. All fuzzy computer
programs end with a step that produces an unambiguous output, a step called
defuzzification.”).
83. I am speaking only of form. There are strong policies entailed in the choice
of form. There are many effects of the form chosen. For an example, presenting a
range of consequences to the factfinder may psychologically affect the factfinder’s
performance. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the
Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 211 (1972) (giving jurors multiple choices of conviction varying in
severity decreased the number of acquittals).
84. See Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655,
666–68 (2014) (calling dichotomous consequences bumpy, and nondichotomous
consequences smoother).
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The list of factors would comprise a number of relevant
considerations. The factors listed by the law-giver might
constitute the whole list of relevant factors or might merely
be suggestive of other factors. That is, they might be
exhaustive, in which case the law-giver is saying to the lawapplier: consider only these factors, and if the combination is
strong enough in your judgment, impose the consequence. Or
they might be nonexhaustive, in which case the law-giver is
saying to the law-applier: consider these factors along with
whatever else you think worth considering in order to render
a decision. Obviously, the former puts a greater restraint on
the law-applier, and so this subdivision is an important
one.85
Alternatively, the law-giver could exclude a factor, such
as race, from consideration. It would then be saying to the
law-applier: do not give any weight to this factor when you
weigh whatever else you are considering in order to render a
decision.
5. Nonsystematic v. Systematic
A scalar directive might just list a bunch of vague factors,
even making the list nonexhaustive, and then give no way to
combine them or even to make them commensurable. Here
the directive puts minimal controls on the law-applier.86 In
contrast, some exhaustive directives are so systematized as
to merit their own label, such as true balancing tests. If such
a test is taken seriously, the law-applier will find itself rather
boxed in.
Nonsystematized and systematized are not merely
adjectives. They signal directives that are different in
character. They are worthy of separate treatment. Indeed,
85. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 30, at 30 (exhaustiveness “moves
some distance from being a pure standard and toward being a ‘rule’”).
86. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016)
(“Therefore, although admissions officers can consider race as a positive feature
of a minority student’s application, there is no dispute that race is but a ‘factor of
a factor of a factor’ in the holistic-review calculus.”).
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experience shows that the best subdivision of scalar
directives is between those that are not systematized and
those that are systematized.
a. Balancing Tests. Balancing tests could be defined very
broadly, ending up as meaning any scalar directive.
Balancing would then mean a method of “identifying
interests implicated by the case” and reaching a decision “by
explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified
interests.”87 Balancing tests would thus run the full
spectrum from nonsystematized to systematized, that is,
from largely unconstraining to somewhat controlling.88
I propose instead to define “true balancing tests” as only
certain scalar directives, those that are highly systematized
and controlling. First, a true balancing test explicitly or
implicitly presents an exhaustive listing of factors to be
weighed against one another, which would usually be done
to choose between dichotomous outcomes. An exhaustive
listing could be definitive, although it could instead be
exhaustive only in the sense of “all things considered.”
Second, true balancing implies rough quantification of the
factors. Third, the quantification must come in a
commensurable measure, so as to allow an attempt at true
balancing.89 I am not suggesting that balancing ties the
decider’s hands and eliminates deciding by hunch. But
having to place even rough estimates of specified factors onto
a balance does nudge the judge or other decider toward self-

87. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987) (criticizing balancing in contrast to binary directives);
see Wilson, supra note 11, at 773 (defining balancing in contrast to binary
directives).
88. See FRANCISCO J. URBINA, A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING
9 (2017) (identifying two accounts of balancing: “One sees [it] as a doctrinal tool
aimed at maximising the interests, values, or principles at stake in the case. . . .
The other account sees [it] as a doctrinal tool that allows judges to engage in
open-ended moral reasoning, unconstrained by legal sources.”).
89. See Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus
Structured Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992, 1047–50 (2019) (showing
that quantification and commensurability are surmountable challenges).
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discipline, while giving appellate panels and the public a
handle for review.
There remains room for some variety among true
balancing tests, in terms of the degree of systematization and
in terms of the interests balanced. Any sorts of interests
could be balanced, as long as they are expressed in
commensurable terms. Thus, state and federal interests are
balanced to determine the applicable law under Erie.90
Moreover, the balance could be weighted in one direction by
fixing certain interests on one side of the balance or by
heightening the standard of decision. For example, the right
to civil counsel rests on procedural due process’s cost-benefit
balance, but the balance is performed against a presumption
that the right exists only if physical liberty is at risk.91
One common kind of true balancing test calls for a
“balance of equities.” It is used, for example, in deciding
whether to allow a party to alter its position in litigation, as
by amending pleadings, discovery responses, or pretrial
orders. For amendment of the pleadings under Federal Rule
15(a)(2),92 the equities are seen as fault and harm. It is up to
the opponent (O) of the amendment’s movant (M) to convince
the judge to disallow the amendment by showing a balance
of the parties’ and public’s interests in favor of no
amendment.93 Because the equities involve a set of offsetting
factors that fall on either side of the balance, the
amendment’s opponent must show:

90. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); CLERMONT, supra note
18, at 206–09.
91. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (describing
the presumption); infra text accompanying note 96 (describing the cost-benefit
balance).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice
so requires.”); supra text accompanying note 42 (discussing that Rule).
93. See LINDELL, supra note 49, at 20 (“Balancing of interests can be triadic.”).
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(M’s fault – prejudice to M) > (O’s fault – prejudice to O +
net public interest).
M’s fault comes from any delay in moving to amend, the
prejudice to M means detriment to a full presentation of the
merits that would be unavoidably caused by denying the
amendment, O’s fault comes from any inducing of the delay,
and the prejudice to O means the disadvantage to reliance
interests attributable to the delay that would be unavoidably
caused by allowing the amendment. Then the court must
throw onto the scales of the balance the considerations of
public interest, which usually favor amendment.94
Another common kind of true balancing test calls for
cost-minimization or, equivalently, cost-benefit analysis.95
For a first and notable example, the Supreme Court has
defined procedural due process to require a procedural
safeguard only when the expected harm without the
safeguard substantially outweighs the safeguard’s cost.96 For
a second example, courts employ this kind of balancing in
deciding whether to give a protective order against
discovery.97 Third, a request for declaratory judgment is
justiciable in “a case of actual controversy.”98 That term
sounds like a binary directive. But the courts have not so
interpreted it. Instead of the more usual kind of categorical
definition, they have adopted a so-called operational
definition, which defines in terms of the outcome of a
specified process. Here, an actual controversy exists if the
private and public benefits of deciding a declaratory
judgment suit exceed the private and public costs of
deciding.99
94. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 79–80.
95. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018).
96. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
99. CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 149. Similarly, “validity” of a judgment rests
on whether the judgment is of sufficient quality to withstand an attack by request
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Prime Example of Balancing Test: injunctive
relief.
Issuance of a permanent injunction as final relief
is quite different from issuing provisional injunctive
relief. In reality, the decision on final relief is not so
different from other remedial final decisions. First,
final injunctive relief depends primarily on the
substantive law. That decisional law will consist, as
usual, of various binary directives and scalar
directives. Second, traditional equitable restrictions
on relief would limit final injunctive relief.100 Some of
these are apparently viewed as binary. An example
would be the requirement that there be no adequate
legal remedy.101 Others are unabashedly indefinite.
An example would be the discretionary balancing of
the parties’ and public’s interests to decide on whether
to issue a final injunction in favor of the prevailing
party rather than other relief.102 Third, a costminimization balancing technique would guide the
court in selecting the terms of any injunction, so
extending the balancing form to nondichotomous
outcomes.103
Now, return to the test for provisional injunctive
relief. Professor John Leubsdorf has brilliantly argued
for relief from judgment, a process that turns on a balance of equities. See id.
385–88.
100. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 1180–86; 1 JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE
LAW OF INJUNCTIONS §§ 7–33 (Shirley T. High ed., 4th ed. 1905); 11A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, §§ 2942–2946; cf. supra note 72 (discussing
equitable restrictions on preliminary injunctions).
ON THE

101. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 2944, at 85–87 (“The legal remedy
may be deemed inadequate if any one of a number of factors is present. . . .
Probably the most common method of demonstrating that there is no adequate
legal remedy is by showing that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the court
does not intervene and prevent the impending injury.”).
102. See id. § 2942, at 40–42, 51–53; Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78
HARV. L. REV. 994 (1965).
103. See supra text accompanying note 84 (discussing nondichotomous
consequences).
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that the decisional law should further control the
judge’s discretion by focusing more sharply on the
purpose of a preliminary injunction.104 He established
that a preliminary injunction’s aim is to minimize in
the interim the probable irreparable loss of legal
rights that would be caused by an erroneous decision
reached by the rudimentary procedure for decision on
provisional relief.105 The correct decision would come
from comparing the expected costs of wrongful denial
with the expected costs of wrongful grant.106
His motivating idea is simple. After the court
settles on the terms of the potential preliminary
injunction by a cost-minimization balancing
technique, the issue becomes a dichotomous one:
104. Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 542. His theory was adopted in Packaging
Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 111–12 (Mass. 1980), and,
more famously, by Judge Posner in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital
Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986). But the Seventh Circuit
returned to its four-factor balancing test in Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson
& Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11–12 (7th Cir. 1992).
105. See Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 540–41. This is the key analytic step.
Those sophisticated analysts who disagree with Leubsdorf do so because they see
a different purpose for the preliminary injunction. See Richard R.W. Brooks &
Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the
Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005) (claiming the
purpose of the preliminary injunction is to promote efficient conduct during a
lawsuit); Vaughn, supra note 68, at 850–51 (claiming the purpose of the
preliminary injunction is to “create a state of affairs that will best give effective
relief to the parties when the case has been fully heard on the merits”). Leubsdorf
wrote a convincing rebuttal of Brooks & Schwartz, see John Leubsdorf,
Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2007),
as well as a prescient one to Vaughan. See Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 545–46.
106. See Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 542 (“The court, in theory, should assess
the probable irreparable loss of rights an injunction would cause by multiplying
the probability that the defendant will prevail by the amount of the irreparable
loss that the defendant would suffer if enjoined from exercising what turns out
to be his legal right. It should then make a similar calculation of the probable
irreparable loss of rights to the plaintiff from denying the injunction. Whichever
course promises the smaller probable loss should be adopted.”). By using a
balancing approach, the judge may avoid the lock-in effect, which biases a judge
against neutrally revisiting the merits when the judge has already made a
provisional decision. See Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary
Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 802–03, 809–11 (2014).
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either grant the envisaged preliminary injunction or
do not. To minimize costs, the court should compare
the expected costs of error on each route and, of course,
should take the route that is less costly. A true
balancing test could capture the two routes’
comparison. The court should grant provisional relief
when (1) the expected costs of wrongfully denying it
exceed (2) the expected costs of wrongfully granting it.
The first factor equals the product of the estimated
probability (P) that the plaintiff is in the right, in the
sense of winning the case ultimately,107 times the
unavoidable and irreparable harms (Hp) to the
plaintiff’s and others’ legal rights in the absence of the
preliminary injunction, with the substantive law
determining which harms to count.108 The second
factor equals the product of the probability that the
defendant will win the case times the unavoidable and
irreparable harms (Hd) to the defendant’s and others’
legal rights that would be caused by the preliminary
107. P measures the probability of the plaintiff ultimately winning, as
calculated on the hastily heard and considered, and hence uncertain, facts and
law. The standard of review creates some puzzles, however. See Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 757 (1986) (discussing
the usually deferential standard of review, but saying that the lower court’s view
of the law is subject to plenary review). The court of appeals, after conducting
plenary review on issues of law and, whenever feasible, resolving any uncertainty
as to the law, should accept the district court’s factfindings unless clearly
erroneous. Then the appellate court would in effect rebalance, with the question
before it being whether its view implies that the district court abused discretion
in granting or denying the preliminary injunction. See OfficeMax, Inc. v.
Levesque, 658 F.3d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 2011) (“A district court’s decision to grant a
preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Within this ambit,
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and issues of law are reviewed de
novo. ‘While the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is reversible
only for an abuse of discretion, an incorrect finding of law in determining the
likelihood of success on the merits is not within the district court’s discretion.’”
(quoting Paris v. HUD, 843 F.2d 561, 574 (1st Cir. 1988)) (citations omitted));
Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 556–57.
108. Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary
Relief, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 197, 199 (2003) (arguing that the formula should also
take into account the uncertainty in estimating H, despite the complications of
doing so).
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preliminary injunction if and only if:

grant

795
the

P Hp > (1 – P) Hd.
The formula captures fully the first three of the four
factors in the dominant approach to preliminary
injunctions.109 The fourth factor of public interests
enters the formula as well, constituting part of Hp or
Hd, but perhaps only insofar as third-party interests
are relevant to final decision under the substantive
law.110
This formula thus serves to help define the four
factors.111 More importantly, it specifies the
relationship among the factors. It thereby works to
discipline somewhat the judge’s function by specifying
the relevant factors and showing how they interact.
Imposing this discipline seems preferable to the
sometimes lazy, whimsical, or biased—and always
hidden—exercise of equitable power. In other words,
this formula serves the important purpose of
decisional law to reduce the realm of subjective
decision making’s unobservable black box, even if that
realm can never be and arguably should not be
completely eliminated.112

109. See Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 544–45 (relating the formula to the
dominant test).
110. See id. at 549–50 (arguing that the concern is with wrongful loss of legal
rights, not with all harms). But cf. Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Repairing
(the Doctrine of) Irreparable Harm: Economic Analysis of Preliminary
Injunctions, https://works.bepress.com/barak_medina/6/, at 11 n.30 (2008)
(arguing that the cases take a broader view of the public interests).
111. See also Grosskopf & Medina, supra note 110 (refining “irreparable
harm”).
112. See Hal R. Arkes & Victoria A. Shaffer, Should We Use Decision Aids or
Gut Feelings, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 411 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds.,
2006) (giving a psychological perspective).
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Courts113 and commentators114 attack the formula
for being, well, a formula. But it does not require
numerical analysis. It is just championing rigorous
thinking. It identifies all the relevant factors and tells
how they interact.115 If the formula is correct, then
arguing for authority to give a different answer is an
argument that equity should liberate the judge to give
the wrong answer. Pushing for any approach
comprising undefined factors to be combined in an
unspecified way is championing lawlessness, even
here where there are no offsetting benefits of an
obscure directive.116
True balancing tests are very significant because they
offer a route to retrieving control in the application of any
law that has to be expressed in scalar terms. It is the way to
make a “standard” more “rule-like.” Separating out true
balancing tests as a subcategory is a necessary step in

113. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 609
(7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (“The judgment of a district judge in an
injunction proceeding must be flexible and discretionary—within the bounds of
the now settled four-prong test.”). By intuition, Swygert would have denied
provisional relief to AHS, despite the apparent harm and its good case. In his
view, equity dictated that provisional relief should rest on unquantifiable factors,
on a feel for the case, on the judge’s discretion. The formula would eliminate his
supposedly beneficial discretion. Finally, Posner’s majority did not, and could not,
provide exact numbers to work the formula, Swygert said. But see Linz Audain,
Of Posner, and Newton, and Twenty-First Century Law: An Economic and
Statistical Analysis of the Posner Rule for Granting Preliminary Injunctions, 23
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1215, 1264 (1990) (“The [formula] demands that judges stop
implying that they are engaged in generating anything but an intuitive guess.”).
114. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (with Kindness) the Felicific Calculus
of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REV. 541, 543 (1987) (“This Article argues that
Judge Posner’s efforts to Benthamize civil procedure are an abomination in
theory and practice.”); Diego M. Pestana, The “Feel” of a Case: Virtue DecisionMaking as the Correct Approach for Deciding Cases in Equity, 31 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 17 (2018).
115. See Leubsdorf, supra note 69, at 550–56 (discussing estimations).
116. See id. at 566 (“Concealing the difficulties of the preliminary injunction
decision under bland generalizations has discouraged lawyers and judges from
confronting them.”).
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constructing a good typology of decisional law, a step that the
current rule/standard distinction does not take.
b. Other Multicriteria Analyses. As decisions become more
complex in terms of multiple factors to consider, and
especially as the options among consequences begin to
multiply, the law of the future might turn to decision making
theory in order to formulate its decisional law.117
For example, simple additive weighting, or SAW,
requires the decision maker to specify the n criteria that
guide decision and then to weight them, w1→n. The decision
maker then scores each of the i options with respect to each
specified criterion, s1→n. That will produce an overall score,
S1→i, for each option equal to:
Sx = w1s1 + w2s2 + … + wnsn.
The decision maker finally chooses, from the i choices, the
option with the highest overall score.118 Thus, SAW can serve
as a tool for solving optimization problems.
F. Combinations
I have been dealing in the basic units of decisional law.
There are binary and scalar directives. I have suggested
subdividing binary directives into those with truly crisp
conditions and those that have some spongy conditions.
For
scalar
directives,
I
have
suggested
as
subdivisions dichotomous v. nondichotomous consequences
and exhaustive v. nonexhaustive and nonsystematic v.
systematic conditions. That produces eight basic types of
directives.
It is essential also to realize that the binary and scalar
forms can constitute steps in a bigger decisional process.119

117. See generally LINDELL, supra note 49.
118. See id. at 72–77 (explaining SAW).
119. Cf. Wilson, supra note 11, at 773 (“This stark dichotomy between
archetypal rules and standards can distract us from evaluating courts’ frequent
application of other ‘forms of doctrine’ and the foreseeable effects of those other
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There are many kinds of combination. For the simplest
example, a binary directive can be subject to an exception,
which likewise could be stated as a binary directive.120 But
the directive or its exception could take the form of a scalar
directive.121
Similarly, if the law is treating a problem that is
admittedly polycentric, it does not follow that the law must
be scalar. The law can address some polycentric problems by
a complex set of binary directives.122
Also, a binary directive could authorize use of a
particular scalar directive. In equal protection analysis, for
illustration, the decision maker is told crisply that if a
traditionally suspect classification is involved, then apply
strict scrutiny, which is seemingly a scalar directive.123 More
commonly, a binary step might work as a screening device to
keep cases from reaching a balancing test.124
Or a scalar directive may determine a classification,
which then operates as a condition in what would otherwise
be a binary directive. For example, whether someone is an
forms. The phrase ‘forms of doctrine’ refers to such doctrinal structures as
exceptions, multiple factor tests, totality of the circumstances tests, ‘escape
hatches,’ and several other hybrid variants (containing elements of both rules
and standards), all of which can appear separately or in myriad combinations in
a particular substantive area.”).
120. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872, 878 (1991)
(characterizing exceptions as a rule intersecting another rule).
121. Cf. Wilson, supra note 11, at 794–98 (citing exceptions to free speech, such
as obscenity).
122. See Schlag, supra note 4, at 422–24 (making this point).
123. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
699 (5th ed. 2015) (“The government must have a truly significant reason for
discriminating, and it must show that it cannot achieve its objective through any
less discriminatory alternative.”). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental
Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A Case Study in Categorization
and Balancing, 55 ALB. L. REV. 605, 606 (1992) (arguing that strict scrutiny
means that the government loses, but at least “[i]ntermediate scrutiny is real
balancing”).
124. See Kaplow, supra note 89, at 993–96, 1060–61 (arguing that such
combined directives are inferior to an unconstrained balancing test).
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employee serves as a condition in some crisp-sounding
provisions of workers’ law, but the employee status rests on
an indefinite weighing of factors.125 This common sort of
combination is important, because it marks the usual route
by which “rules,” in the old typology, degrade into
“standards.” It likewise results in a binary directive losing
its crispness.126
The checklist of a binary directive and a consideration of
scalar factors could be linked by “and” or “or” to create
necessary or sufficient sets of conditions. Thus, although a
complicated law may seem different from the binary and
scalar categories, it may not be a new species but instead
might simply be a combination of binary and scalar units.127
Prime
Example
of
Combination
Test:
preliminary injunction by series of directives.
Some courts have attempted to avoid using a
scalar directive for preliminary injunction decisions.
What they use is a series of supposedly binary
directives in a crude attempt to achieve the right
results without all the usual vagueness.
This approach is called the alternatives test.128 If
the plaintiff can show probable success on the merits

125. See ROBERT N. COVINGTON & JOSEPH A. SEINER, EMPLOYMENT LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 20 (4th ed. 2017) (“Many of the protections afforded workers by the
statutes and common law doctrines discussed apply only if those workers are
‘employees’ . . . . [T]hese definitions are often couched in general terms, providing
courts and administering agencies with little concrete guidance about how to
work out the details.”). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM.
LAW INST. 1958) (“In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or
an independent contractor, the following matters of fact [(a)–(j)], among others,
are considered . . . .”), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) cmt. f
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stressing control factor).
126. See supra text accompanying note 52.
127. See Brendan T. Beery & Daniel R. Ray, Five Different Species of Legal
Tests—and What They All Have in Common, 37 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 501, 514–16,
535–37 (2019) (misconceiving means-ends tests as a separate species).
128. See Vaughn, supra note 68, at 840. Another combination test is the
“gateway factor test.” See, e.g., Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d
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and irreparable injury, the plaintiff should get a
preliminary injunction; or, if the plaintiff has a
reasonably good case but also can show a balance of
hardships that tips decidedly toward him or her, then
likewise the plaintiff should get that temporary
protection.129 Thus, two directives are combined as
alternative routes to relief. The “bicephalous”130
conditions are stated as if crisp, although the prospect
of success is a scalar measure and, more disruptively,
the balance of hardships refers to the outcome of an
indefinite balancing test.
This is not to say that this judicial approach to
preliminary injunctions is a good one. The problem
with it is that it tries to capture what is inherently a
sliding scale by stating as alternatives the min-max
and max-min conditions for the two variables of
chance of success and balance of harms. As a result of
this clumsiness, it would both give a preliminary
injunction where there should be none (e.g., the
plaintiff has a slightly better than even case on the
merits, where the plaintiff would suffer some minor
Cir. 2017) (“Accordingly, we follow our precedent that a movant for preliminary
equitable relief must meet the threshold for the first two ‘most critical’ factors: it
must demonstrate that it can win on the merits (which requires a showing
significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not) and
that it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief. If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the
remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors,
taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.”);
Payne, supra note 75, at 54–56.
129. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 526
F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1976) (“This court has adopted the alternative test.”);
Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973)
(“The settled rule is that a preliminary injunction should issue only upon a clear
showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable
injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a
fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the
party requesting the preliminary relief.”), modified by Salinger v. Colting, 607
F.3d 68, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2010) (stressing that the court must deal with likelihoods
of harms).
130. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 368 (2d ed. 1984).
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irreparable injury and where the defendant and the
public would suffer major harm pendente lite) and
deny a preliminary injunction where there should be
one (e.g., a toss-up case, where the balance of
hardships tips less than decidedly toward the
plaintiff). For the possibility of a small increase in
workability,
the
alternatives
test
produces
nonsensical results. In the long run, the alternatives
test is doomed.131

131. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir.
2019) (en banc) (applying a four-factor test); Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG
Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (arguing
for “flexibility in the face of varying factual scenarios”); William Hughes
Mulligan, The Second Circuit Review—1975–76 Term—Foreword: Preliminary
Injunction in the Second Circuit, 43 BROOK. L. REV. 831 (1977).
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CONCLUSION
The shortcomings of rule/standard are currently many.
First, no agreement exists on what exactly this terminology
means. Second, all of its possible meanings constitute a
continuum, and spectral distinctions are usually difficult to
draw. Third, the rule/standard line on any such continuum
is not sharp in actuality. Fourth, however the line is drawn,
some rules are very standard-like, and some standards are
quite rule-like. Fifth, the classification itself, as opposed to
its evocation, does not ultimately aid legal actors in
formulating or applying the law.
There exists a clearer and more useful distinction: binary
and scalar directives. The essence of this distinction is easy
to grasp and employ. If the directive comprises a checklist of
one or more binary conditions, then it is a binary directive. If
instead the directive calls for consideration of a scalar factor,
it is a scalar directive. Binary/scalar could be as evocative an
image as is rule/standard. On the one hand, rule/standard
evokes some sense of how much the lawmaker has pinned
things down. On the other hand, “binary” also delivers this
sense of a rule, but the characteristic of crispness also
reminds us that the decisional law can fail to pin things down
if the condition is softly crisp. “Scalar” likewise conveys the
unsettledness of a standard, but also recognizes that
systematized directives can reduce indefiniteness and
retrieve the aim of pinning things down.
Moreover, binary/scalar is a superior distinction for
analysis. First, binary/scalar is a clear and clean distinction.
Second, it is a telling distinction that represents a significant
difference between the components that compose the law.
Third, it tells the law-applier much about whether the lawgiver tried to pin things down. Fourth, it conveys a better
sense of the tools at hand for the law-giver’s pinning down
the law-applier, and thus enables the tools’ deployment in an
optimal way. Fifth, it allows the drawing of meaningful
subdivisions that bring to the fore the choices in shaping that
law: for example, a true balancing test explicitly or implicitly
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presents an exhaustive listing of quantifiable and
commensurable factors to be weighed against one another—
and offers a route to retrieving control in the application of
any law that has to be expressed as a scalar directive.
A running example to illustrate the superiority of
binary/scalar comes from injunctive relief. The test for a
temporary restraining order was the binary condition of
“irreparable harm,” but it has disintegrated in practice to
conform to the prevailing test for a preliminary injunction.
The diversity among the tests for a preliminary injunction
reveals the essential and eternal struggle between the
necessary flexibility for infinitely variable situations and the
need for appropriately corralling the judges’ discretion. From
ancient roots of unrestrained discretion, the test for a
preliminary injunction has evolved in recent decades from a
sequential test of four supposedly binary conditions to the
indefiniteness of a sliding-scale approach that balances the
four factors, back to a hopeless stab at crispness in the form
of the alternatives test that tries to state alternative
combinations of situational facts warranting provisional
relief. The best test, to my mind, emerges as a systematized
form of scalar directive—a true balancing test—that asks if
the expected costs of a potentially wrongful denial exceed the
expected costs of a potentially wrongful grant of a
preliminary injunction. But whether the reader agrees or
disagrees on the substance of the best preliminary injunction
test, the reader should see the inadequacy of rule/standard
for this analysis of optimal form: all the competing tests
would probably be currently categorized as “standards.”
In sum, through general theorizing and by specific
examples, this Article supports binary/scalar as a top-level
distinction among the forms of decisional law. It will work
better than the current conception of rule/standard.
However, I am not suggesting casting rule/standard aside as
a way of classifying decisional law. For one thing, it is too
much a part of our vocabulary. It is also a usefully evocative
image. I am instead suggesting binary/scalar as a technical
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redefinition of “rules” and “standards.” That is, binary/scalar
should provide the metarule for categorizing between rule
and standard.
How would this metarule work? While lawmaking, the
law-giver would tentatively decide whether the law-applier
should make binary decisions or should roughly measure
quantities often in relation to one another. The law-giver
would do so on notions of desirable division of labor between
law-giver and law-applier. In finalizing the form of the law,
the law-giver could consider the traditional rule/standard
feelings to decide just how directive it could and should be—
such as realizable benefits of workable certainty or flexible
accuracy, relative costs of promulgation and application, and
institutional capacities. Then, when considering the result,
the law-giver might adjust. On the one hand, if a tentatively
binary directive ends up with soft conditions, the law-giver
might decide to switch to an honestly scalar directive. It
should not try to deceive by constructing a “rule.” On the
other hand, if a scalar directive needs to be more
constraining, the lawmaker might move away from a
“standard” toward a systematized scalar directive, perhaps a
true balancing test, rather than deforming the decisional law
by trying to achieve crispness. Thus, familiar rule/standard
feelings can help in deciding how to deploy binary and scalar
directives.

